The study analyses expenditures of all municipalities of the Czech Republic over the period [2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010][2011][2012][2013]. It aims to examine whether changes in municipal spending get aff ected by the electoral cycle. The analysis has proven that expenditures of municipalities of the Czech Republic are infl uenced by the political cycle. However, the political business cycle has at the level of municipalities (compared to the macroeconomic level) its peculiarities. These arise mainly from limited options of municipal politicians to use economic instruments to win electoral votes in elections. To receive electoral votes, municipal politicians use mainly public investments and projects that are at the level of municipalities so apparent that they may infl uence voters in their electoral decision-making. Prior to elections, expenditures on investments signifi cantly increase for all municipal size groups. For municipal size groups of over 50,000 residents, however, they are (per capita) higher compared to smaller municipal size groups. This may be explained by the fact that these municipalities have higher disposable resources (higher per capita own budgetary revenues, higher potential to acquire resources to co-fi nance municipal projects and broader portfolio of debt fi nancing). Expenditures on transfers do not signifi cantly change prior to municipal elections. We interpret this fi nding in a way that politicians prefer such investment projects that are "visible". Transfers are used to pay for certain current expenses for which municipalities may (in accordance with the established rules) apply through grants.
Introduction
Activity of politicians on the political market (Downs, 1998) gets infl uenced by a number of factors (Alesina and Roubini, 1992) . One of them is the rational motive of politicians to get re-elected in elections. Towards this end, politicians (governments) use economic instruments in order to win on their side voters in elections. The theory of the political business cycle deals with a theoretical explanation of this issue. This theory conceives politicians as rationally behaving actors who act on the political market so as to infl uence the decision-making of voters in their favour. Models assume that politicians (same as agents on the political market) have their utility function with parameters they attempt to maximise. The aim of politicians is thus to increase the likelihood of their re-election. This manipulation of politicians with the electorate is built into the political business cycle models in that voters vote on the basis of economic variables.
Since the length of the political election cycle is (as opposed to the economic cycle) known, politicians (governments) may with respect to the given length of an election term project within individual stages of the electoral cycle their objectives and implement their activities.
Manipulation of politicians with economic instruments is caused by an effort to implement positive measures towards the date of elections, when politicians by their measures appeal to voters with the aim to win their votes. Following the elections, politicians usually deal with unpopular issues associated with the effects of previous decisions (Slaný a Žák, 1999) .
These activities, spread out into the individual phases of the electoral cycle (prior to elections, within the fi rst half of the electoral cycle and within the second half of the electoral cycle with the prospect of upcoming elections) may be empirically recorded through changes in economic indicators (employment, public expenditures, budget defi cit, GDP growth and infl ation). A theoretical refl ection of this issue provides the political business cycle theory. The theory of the political business cycle almost invariably focuses on the analysis of macroeconomic impacts of political decisions of the central government. Therefore, there emerges a question whether it is possible to register the existence of the political business cycle at the level of municipal governments. The aim of this study is to examine expenditures of municipalities of the Czech Republic (carried out over the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] , i.e. whether changes in expenditures are affected by the electoral cycle, to test the related hypotheses and from the executed analysis to draw theoretical conclusions.
Research Foundations
With the idea of the political business cycle comes Nordhaus (1975) and subsequently also Lindbeck (1976) and McRae (1977) . The model by Nordhaus assumes opportunistic parties and irrational voters. Within the fi rst stage of the political business cycle, the government carries out a deliberate pre-election expansion. Its consequences are a reduction in unemployment, GDP growth, but also an increase in infl ation. Towards "taming"of infl ation and other unpopular actions it gets within the second stage of the political business cycle, characterised by a restriction. The government directs unpopular measures into the fi rst half of the post-election period. Because voters are irrational ("forgetful" and "incorrigible"), the government may repeat the entire procedure again prior to next elections.
With a different view on the political business cycle comes Hibbs (1977) . In the model by Hibbs, political parties stand out as actors who profess various ideologies and therefore also address "their groups" of voters. Voters are rational actors who within the political market (Downs, 1998) choose the appropriate political party whose political ideology the most accurately refl ects their voting preferences.
If we for the sake of simplifi cation assume a right-left political spectrum, then the right-wing government prefers low infl ation, higher unemployment and lower redistribution of the generated GDP through public expenditures while the left-wing government gives its priority to higher employment rates, higher rate of infl ation and higher degree of redistribution through public spending. Leftist, respectively right-wing voters in turn (with regard to their respective ideology) vote for the relevant political party.
Both mentioned models soon found their followers and elaborators. Already in the 1980s there emerges a new generation of models based on the idea of rational expectations. With a rational opportunistic model come Rogoff and Sibert (1988) . Because voters are rational, the government cannot positively affect real variables (Rogoff, 1990) . Provided the government undertakes prior to elections an expansionary fi scal policy, the result is only increased infl ation. Efforts of opportunistic political parties to win over an ideological voter are thus misguided.
With a rationally ideological model come Alesina (1987) , Alesina and Sachs (1986) . This model is based on the assumption of a rationally behaving voter and a political party governed by its own ideology. If we assume a left-right political spectrum, then the leftwing party will just prior to elections carry out an expansionary economic policy in order to achieve a higher level of employment and GDP growth. However, the consequence of an expansion is also a growth of infl ation. Because voters are rational actors, there comes to changes in employment only for a short period of time since voters adapt to the given changes. The ultimate effect of the leftist politics is a growth in infl ation.
With different objectives comes ahead of elections the right-wing political party. Its priority objective is to reduce infl ation. However, the government may achieve this objective only for a short period of time since within the next period this goal will be prevented by rational expectations of voters.
As clear from the brief overview of the political business cycle models, the given models are linked by an identical conclusion that politicians seek to infl uence the outcome of elections through instruments of fi scal policy (especially via public expenditures, refl ected in the budget defi cit). Contemporary panel empirical research (see e.g. Shi and Svenson, 2006; Drazen, 2001; Persson and Tabellini, 2003) proves is considered the existence of the political business cycle. Its existence also by Brender and Drazen (2005) in the case of the so-called new democracies which include also the Czech Republic. Brender and Drazen point out that the political business cycle may also be shrouded by manipulations of politicians with shifting of public expenditures so that at a fi rst glance the manipulation of politicians with the economy may not be apparent.
Also in the Czech Republic we fi nd studies that on data of the Czech Republic examine the policy-economic cycle (see e.g. Žák, 1998; Janků, 2013) or deal with the political legislation cycle (Brechler and Geršl, 2011) , namely test models of the political business cycle in conditions of the Czech Republic (Štiková, 2007 ). An analysis of these studies leads to the conclusion that in the Czech Republic there may be also from the economic impacts of political decisions of the central government inferred an existence of the political business cycle.
With regard to examination of the political business cycle at the level of municipalities, there is only a modest number of studies dealing with that issue. Sedmihradská, Haas and Kubík examine on the case of 205 municipalities of the Czech Republic (over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] the relationship between an electoral year and capital expenditures. The research fi ndings confi rm existence of the political business cycle and opportunistic behaviour of politicians. The study by Portuguese authors Veiga and Veiga (2007) comes with a different approach. Authors of the study examine changes in municipal investment expenditures prior to elections. These are such expenditures that are on the part of an electorate clearly visible. Voters in their municipalities certainly discern such investments as constructions or repairs of roads, repairs of churches or schools. In such a case tempering with expenditures is carried out through changes in the structure of expenditures. Within the election year thus there increases the share of capital expenditures channelled towards "visible investment projects".
With a different concept comes Rosenberg (1992) . He assumes the case where a rational politician does not seek his/her re-election but through the implemented and arranged projects prepares his/her position following the end of the election period when a politician passes over to the commercial sphere. In the Czech Republic it is possible to record similar cases for which we use the term "politics as an elevator to the business sector". The given citizen becomes a politician in order to take advantage of politics as a means of his/her preparation for the successful entry into the business sector. This type of a politician does not seek his/her re-election for another voting term. However, during the regular voting term he/she arranges and approves projects that within rigged contests get awarded to friendly or otherwise close fi rms. Such cases are usually associated with the corruption in public procurement (Pavel, 2013; Vlach, Nemec, 2001) . We may also record cases when the position of the leaving politician is upon the new election term taken over by a person that is close to him/her and whose entry into politics the outgoing politician supported. Also these are known cases from the municipal politics of the Czech Republic. It considers politicians with a "seat reservation" for an entry into politics.
From the analysis of studies dealing with the political business cycle it is possible to draw the following general conclusions. Although political business cycle models differ in their theoretical fundaments, they are linked by the same ontology -that is, the real existence of the political business cycle. The reality of the political business cycle is theoretically examined from different perspectives. This difference is refl ected in plurality of political business cycle models. Because these models in principle portray the same reality, we can fi nd a common structural assumption of the political business cycle models -in that the voters vote on the basis of economic variables while this choice is infl uenced by the deliberate activity of politicians oriented towards swaying the voter. This deliberate activity of politicians takes the form of governmental measures that affect economic performance, unemployment and infl ation.
At the central level there are thus governmental activities within the fi rst cycle (i.e. prior to elections) characterised by an expansive fi scal policy and fi scal pre-election manipulations, when through boosted public spending there comes to a one-off defl ection of the state budget defi cit. In case within the second cycle (i.e. following the elections) the economy fi nds itself due to an economic expansion above its potential GDP, infl ation increases. To resolve this issue the government adopts a restrictive policy. These unpopular measures the government adopts within the fi rst period of its voting term. This fact is within the political business cycle models depicted as a decrease in public expenditures, decline in employment and reduced infl ation. Although these given theoretical conclusions relate to the macroeconomic level, some are inspiring for the design of a theoretical framework for research of the political business cycle also at the level of municipalities.
Also at the municipal level there may be assumed an existence of the political business cycle. It is characterised by some common features with the political business cycle at the macro level while at the same time it differs. A municipal politician has a similar goal as a politician of the central government -i.e. to get re-elected. The rationality of a municipal politician may, however, manifests itself also through maximising of the personal benefi t of already non-standing political candidates. This relates to the cases known from local politics in the Czech Republic where municipal politics is treated as a means (an elevator) of a politician into the business (commercial) sector.
Another difference of a municipal politician from a politician of the central government rests in the different extent of options to temper with economic tools. This difference is given by the type of a fi scal federalism adopted by different countries. In the centralised model, local government budgets are fully dependent upon grants channelled from the central government. Politicians therefore have a very limited opportunity to move with taxes and they may infl uence rather expenditures. In contrast, within the decentralised model individual municipalities may secure their own revenues through the setting of local taxes and charges. In reality a fully centralised or decentralised model occurs rarely and adopted is rather a mixed model where local governments receive grants from the central government; there comes to a redistribution of income through the budgetary allocation of tax revenues while local governments may, to a limited extent, also set their local taxes and charges.
Legislative rules do not provide municipal politicians with such a room for the use of economic instruments towards pre-election manipulation. In the Czech Republic, municipal politicians have only a very limited opportunity to infl uence their tax and non-tax revenues. This is (in contrast to central government politicians) a signifi cant restriction on the side of municipal budgetary revenues. The main revenues represent shared taxes, distributed in accordance to the Act on Budgetary Allocation of Tax Revenues. Municipalities may further determine through local ordinances the coeffi cient of the tax on immovable property and set the level of local charges which, nevertheless, may not exceed limits set by the law. Revenues from the tax on immovable property and local charges represent, depending on the characteristics of the given municipality, a volume corresponding to ca. single digit percentage points of the total budget. Another possibility of municipalities how to boost their revenues is a sale and privatisation of the municipal property. Last but not least, there are other ways of how to increase the revenue side of the municipal budget -discretionary grants (e.g. from the EU funds or national grants). A number of mayors focus a great deal of attention in particular to discretionary grants and also with this theme they operate prior to elections (i.e. either factual or just declared ability to secure grants for the municipality should act as an attraction to voters). These ways are limited also the possibilities of municipal politicians on the part of budgetary expenditures. Municipalities are required to provide certain public services. An increase in expenditures on these services within the pre-election year (e.g. due to the rising costs of higher quality services) could be indicative of an attempt of politicians to infl uence the decision-making of voters in elections.
Municipalities carry out current and capital expenditures. Into current expenditures there may be included also non-investment transfers. These are non-equivalent payments to private natural and legal entities and non-profi t organisations. In this way there is most frequently sponsored sport, culture, civil societies and education at the local level. Although municipalities often state that grants are distributed based on objective grant schemes, in reality the decision on where the money "will travel" rests in the last instance on councillors and representatives. This means that investment transfers provide a relatively large scope for addressing relatively homogeneous and organised constituencies from the side of politicians.
Public investments provide a relatively broad range of possibilities towards swaying voters prior to elections. Local politicians have an immediate opportunity to infl uence which investments (public projects) shall be within the given municipality implemented.
Public projects are so clearly visible that the residents themselves mark such implemented projects as "memorials of politicians". Politicians are aware of this fact. They know that "their monument" may affect decision-making of voters in elections. Voters likely perceive this fact positively even when the municipality borrows (using e.g. the form of a credit) the necessary resources needed to implement the given project. It is therefore to be expected that within the pre-election period there will be a higher defi cit of municipal budgets compared to the post-election period. A defi cit therefore arises in a situation where expenditures of a municipality are higher that its revenue. The resulting defi cit may be covered either via repayable fi nancial assistance in the form of loans or issued bonds or via surpluses from previous years. For a citizen it is somewhat diffi cult to identify the manner in which the defi cit is covered. Moreover, within offi cially published budgets revenues and expenditures are always balanced; the difference between revenues and expenditures makes up an item called fi nancing (funding). If this item is positive, we fi nd ourselves in a situation where revenues are less than expenditures, the budget is therefore in defi cit. If this item is negative, revenues are larger than expenditures and the budget is in surplus.
Although public projects may be co-fi nanced from the EU funds, voters assess this fact as a "positive act of local politicians" who managed to get those resources. Also this act of politicians infl uences the decision-making of voters in elections because rational (informed) voters are able to distinguish that obtaining fi nancial resources from the EU funds (as opposed to transfers resulting from higher budgets) is due to local politicians (e.g. as they elaborated a successful grant application).
At the municipal level, we may distinguish two kinds of voters. The fi rst group is represented by rational voters who have enough experience with activities of municipal politicians from the previous electoral period and who also possess suffi cient information to rationally decide within their choice of politicians. Voters at the municipal level have a relatively easier access to information about politicians. They frequently know them personally and they are also aware of their work from the previous electoral period and connections to other actors. Therefore we believe that voters on the municipal level vote more for personalities than for political parties. Municipal voters are thus more pragmatic in their choice of politicians.
In this context it is possible to voice an assumption that at the level of municipalities, the political ideology does not play such an important role in the choice of politicians as at the central level. At the same time it is reasonable to assume that there exists an inverse relationship between the preference of voting for a personality and the municipality size (number of voters or residents, respectively) in a sense that the smaller the municipality, the more voters know local politicians and the more they in their choices tend to select politicians based on their personal knowledge of politicians rather than on the basis of an affi liation to a political party. This hypothesis, however, does not stand as a research subject of this study. Due to the absence of necessary data, its verifi cation would require an independent stand-alone research.
Also at the level of municipalities we encounter irrational voters. These are both inexperienced voters as well as "forgetful" voters who forget actions of politicians from the previous electoral term. We believe that the share of inexperienced voters (in relation to the total number of voters) is at the municipality level lower than the proportion of inexperienced voters to the total number of voters who choose their representatives in central authorities.
Hypotheses, Research Methods and Research Procedure
In the context of the theoretical background we aim to investigate the following hypotheses (Table 1) . 
H 2
Within the pre-election year there comes to a signifi cant increase in expenditures on public investments and municipal projects.
H 3
The amount of expenditures on transfers, public investments and municipal projects (reference period is the pre-election year and criterion are per capita expenditures in the given size category of a municipality) does not signifi cantly depend on the size of a municipality.
Methods adopted for verifi cation of individual hypotheses are described in more detail within the section "Data Collection and Research Procedure".
In order to test the hypotheses, we analysed expenditures of all municipalities of the Czech Republic over the period 2003-2012. From the data set there were examined municipal expenditures on transfers and investments. These are such types of expenditures through which it is possible to examine the validity of the theoretical backgrounds and test the hypotheses.
To investigate the relationship between expenditures and the size of a municipality in the per capita form, there were adopted the following size categories of municipalities (Table 2) . The given classifi cation of municipalities allows examining the impact of decentralisation on the existence of the political cycle for municipalities of the Czech Republic and to check what impact on municipal public spending (transfers, public investments and municipal projects) within the pre-election year has the size of a municipality. A similar question posed in their study Sedmihradská, Haas and Kubík (2007) . Their investigation, however, included an analysis of all 205 municipalities with an extended scope of authority over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . We agree on that per capita capital expenditures are signifi cantly higher within the pre-election and election year, but we are of an opinion that per capita capital expenditures are not dependent upon the size of a municipality. Our research (unlike the aforementioned study by Sedmihradská, Haas and Kubík) includes all municipalities of the Czech Republic and all size categories. We believe that the size of investment expenditures within the pre-election year (per capita) does not substantially depend upon the size of a municipality.
Data collection and research procedure
The required data on municipal expenditures and their structure were obtained from the Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic through the Union of Towns and Municipalities of the Czech Republic. The research procedure was implemented in the following steps:
1. Acquired data were adjusted for infl ation using the GDP defl ator. Data on expenditures over the monitored period were recalculated to the base year 2003. 2. Data were divided into 12 groups according to the size of a municipality, for each group we have 10 annual data on costs of transfers and investments. Without any loss of generality we may label both types of data identically. The data are therefore labelled cost ij , where i∈{1, 2, …,12} indicates the group to which the given data belong and the index j in turn indicates the year while there applies that j∈{1, 2, …,10}. 3. Due to the representative comparison of expenditures in individual municipal size categories were costs cost ij recalculated into costs per resident. Let us denote res i the number of residents in the i-th group. Then we get the value costres ij = cost ij /res i . 4. From such adjusted costs there were determined time moving averages that are always based on three consecutive years. Provided we denote these moving averages ij x , then it applies 
For analysis of the dynamics of expenditures on transfers and public investments
we operate with differences in absolute values of expenditures in individual years recalculated per one resident and with differences in the three-year moving average. These differences were labelled as difcost ij and it applies for them that difcost ij = costres ijij x .
6. Time series 2003-2013 was split into the election and non-election years. For election years, the parameter elect j takes the value of 1 while non-election years assume for this parameter the value of 0.
7. From the above values there were determined dependencies of differences in expenditures on transfers and public investments on whether there did or did not take place elections. There was verifi ed a dependency of whether the size of a municipality has within the election period any effect on the change in municipal expenditures (per capita) outlaid on transfers and public investments.
8. There was carried out a correlation analysis of dependencies between differences in costs per resident difcost ij , both expenditures on transfers and expenditures on investments with the parameter elect j and the size of a municipality given by the parameter i. The calculation of a correlation coeffi cient r was carried out using the formula
, where in place of the random variables
x and y we substituted different pairs of variables.
9. In case there was detected a signifi cant dependency, we subsequently performed a regression analysis and searched for a suitable model that would best explain the examined reality using the adjusted coeffi cient of determination (Novotná -Varyšová, 2014 
Research Results and Discussion
To verify changes in the volume of transfers (H 1 ) and changes in the volume of investments (H 2 ) there were used indicators of average differences in expenditures on transfers and investments according to the election and non-election years. These differences (using a moving average) are recalculated to the per capita basis. Final calculations are shown in Table 3 . Table 3 give average values of the variable difcost ij . Provided we divide the table into two groups according to election and non-election years, into the election years belongs data with indices i = 4 and i = 8 (corresponding to the years 2006 and 2010) while the remaining belong to the non-election years.
Results of the analysis cover the period 2003-2012 and relate to the expenditures on transfers and investments for all municipalities of the Czech Republic.
As evident from the data, regarding transfers we recorded in election years there are only very small changes. This empirical fi nding is consistent with theoretical assumptions stated within research foundations. We may therefore observe that municipal politicians do not use transfers as a tool for infl uencing voters. That is also why there does not come to any substantial changes in expenditures on transfers within election and non-election years. The trend in development of transfers (period 2003-2012) are shown Figure 1 . 
Source: authors
From the above fi gure it is clear that the volume of expenditures on transfers (per capita) demonstrates for all size categories of municipalities persistence whereas there does not come to any signifi cant difference depending on the election and non-election years. This fi nding is consistent with the theoretical foundations and confi rms the hypothesis H 1 . As another interpretation comes forward the long-term fi xation of transfers to current municipality revenues.
However, if we examine the level of expenditures on transfers (per capita) over the time series 2003-2012 we fi nd out that expenditures in all years demonstrate for all size categories of municipalities a certain persistence, however, the municipality size categories 11 and 12 (i.e. towns with over 100,000 residents) carry out signifi cantly higher transfers Transfers Size (per capita). This is given mainly due to the budgetary allocation of tax revenues and for the City of Prague (the only town in the Czech Republic with the population of over 1 million residents) also due to the fact that it performs the function of both a municipality and a region. However, overall it applies that the size of a municipality does not have any signifi cant effect on the difference in the volume of transfers within election and nonelection years.
Investments
If we follow the municipal expenditures on investments over the period 2003-2012, we note that staring from municipal categories of over 50,000 residents and above, expenditures on investments (per capita) are clearly higher compared to smaller size categories (see Figure 2 ).
Figure 2 | Expenditures of Municipalities on Investments (per capita) in 2003-2012
Source: authors.
How can be explained the clearly higher expenditures (per capita) on investments for these size categories of municipalities (towns) with over 50,000 residents? These municipalities have likely higher resource capacity towards implementation of investments at their disposal. The reason rests in the setup of parameters within the budgetary allocation of tax revenues. The given towns have also more experiences and possibilities to secure fi nancial resources for implementation of public projects, both in the form of loans as well as obtaining resources through their co-fi nancing (in particular from the EU funds). The City of Prague simultaneously fulfi ls the function of a region -in this sense it also participates on the budgetary revenues and ensures public services in other regions that are regionally provided (for example secondary education, health service, transport services, etc.).
Within a more detailed analysis of investments we fi nd out that in election years there comes to a signifi cant average difference in expenditures on investments. This fi nding supports also the analysis of a number of positive and negative differences in expenditures on investments in election and non-election years (Table 4 ). Table 4 indicates the numbers of positive and negative differences. The number of nonelection data is 96 and the number of election data is 24. The value in columns "Elections" indicates how many of election/non-election data on costs are higher than the corresponding moving average. From these data there was determined the percentage of positive differences that indicates in how many percents of data on costs are costs above average.
As from the data on percentages of positive differences evident, for transfers there is no signifi cant difference between election and non-election years. For investments, however, the difference between non-election and election years becomes very clear. From the above given investigation it is possible to express an assumption that the political cycle may rather be expected for investments whereas this will not be the case for transfers. More precise answers to these questions will help to fi nd out the correlation analysis. Its results are shown in Table 5 .
Grey (and italics) marked values may be considered as statistically signifi cant. For our investigation it is necessary to monitor values of the difference in investments and transfers depending on elections. The correlation coeffi cient of the difference between investments and elections takes the value of 0.317032. This value is statistically signifi cant and indicates a moderately strong linear dependence. We may observe that for investments there exists the political cycle. This means that along elections there come more investments. In the case of transfers the correlation coeffi cient reaches the value of 0.100916. This value is not statistically signifi cant. This confi rms the hypothesis H 1 that within the pre-election year there comes to no signifi cant changes in the volume of transfers. Therefore the relationship between elections and an increase in expenditures on transfers was not established.
When examining the infl uence of the size of a municipality and transfers and the size of a municipality and investments it was found out that the correlation coeffi cients are not statistically signifi cant. Nevertheless, the effect of the size of a municipality was still subjected to an additional analysis in which we examined (separately for election and nonelection years) the impact of the size of a municipality on transfers and investments. Within non-election years (Appendix 1) there are correlation coeffi cients statistically insignifi cant, Pearson´s correlation coeffi cient reaches the value of 0.084980 for transfers and the value of 0.055874 for investments. The data for election years (Appendix 2) showed a moderately strong linear relationship between the size of a municipality and transfers (Pearson´s coeffi cient of 0.367483) and investments (Pearson´s coeffi cient of 0.242804). The limiting factor in this fi nding is the small number of data analysed for the election years. More detailed results are provided within Appendix. Therefore we may observe that the size of a municipality has within elections an impact on the volume of transfers and investments (per capita). Therefore, the hypothesis H 3 was not confi rmed. Based on the previous results we establish that it does not make sense to perform a regression analysis with variables other than investments and election and non-election years. Within the regression analysis we have found out that for the quadratic regression (Appendix 5) and exponential regression (Appendix 4) the coeffi cients are insignifi cant. Signifi cant coeffi cients are only for the linear regression (Appendix 3); however, coeffi cients of determination come out as minimal.
Conclusions
Analysis of expenditures of municipalities of the Czech Republic for the period 2003-2012 leads to the conclusion that also at the level of municipalities there is present the political business cycle. However, the political business cycle has (compared to the macroeconomic level) its peculiarities at the level of municipalities. These mainly arise due to the limited options of municipal politicians to use economic instruments to win electoral votes in elections. Municipal politicians use public investments and projects to win electoral votes. This is confi rmed by the rising expenditures of municipalities on investments prior to elections. That is to say, public investments and projects are visible goods that potentially can signifi cantly affect decision-making of voters in elections. This is also why municipal politicians "set the time" of handover of the projects to the public towards the period just prior to elections.
Municipal politicians are rational and pragmatic. Therefore they implement public projects as a manifestation of the "care of politicians about their citizens". Municipal politicians rationally assume that their voters are informed and pragmatic actors who know about the "care of politicians about their citizens" and therefore will vote for them.
Examination of per capita expenditures on investments yielded the fi nding that these expenditures are higher for the size groups of municipalities with over 50,000 residents. For other size categories they are not very different. This reality may be explained by the fact that towns (respectively groups of municipalities with over 50,000 residents) have higher disposable fi nancial resources (higher per capita own revenues in their budgets and greater ability to raise resources for the co-fi nancing of municipal projects).
Apart from grant entitlements, larger municipalities have a broader portfolio of debt fi nancing options since in a contact with a bank they have a higher bargaining power as well as a broader range of assets with which they may guarantee their obligations.
Expenditures on transfers do not prior to elections signifi cantly change. This fi nding may be interpreted in a way that politicians prefer investment projects that the potential electoral constituency the so-called clearly "see" while transfers are mostly used to cover current operating expenses of associations, athletes and other groups. For these may municipalities apply in the form of subsidies/grants in accordance to the established rules. 
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